Will a hung parliament endanger fiscal consolidation? by Wehner, Joachim
blogs.lse.ac.uk http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/2010/03/26/will-a-hung-parliament-endanger-fiscal-
consolidation/
Will a hung parliament endanger fiscal consolidation?
Mar 26 2010
Many commentators fear the detrimental effects of a hung parliament on the speed and
depth of fiscal adjustment. Yet an election that fails to deliver a clear majority for a single
party need not spell fiscal disaster, says Joachim Wehner – it all depends on how the
resulting government manages the situation.
The argument that minority or coalition governments are less able to respond to economic
shocks gained prominence with a paper by Nouriel Roubini and Jeffrey Sachs published in
1989 (see here). They presented empirical findings that countries with minority or coalition
governments ran higher deficits following the 1973 oil crisis. Alberto Alesina and Allan Drazen explained this
situation as a ‘war of attrition’ in which competing interest groups attempt to pass on the pain of adjustment
to other groups, creating a stand-off that delays adjustment (see here). The argument is highly plausible at
first sight, but there are strong reasons to doubt the inevitability of such an outcome.
For a start, a string of papers casts doubt on the empirical findings presented in the article by Roubini and
Sachs. Some reanalyses find that minority governments, but not coalitions, are associated with higher
deficits, others that the type of government makes no difference at all for fiscal performance. In addition,
cross-national studies point to an empirical regularity that minority administrations account for about one
third of governments in parliamentary systems (see here for the study by Kaare Strøm). Among the countries
with frequent minority governments is Sweden, which is currently touted as the poster boy of fiscal
consolidation. Clearly, minority government does not necessarily have to be bad for fiscal performance.
The key is how minority or coalition governments manage the political context, according to a major study by
Mark Hallerberg, Rolf Strauch and Jürgen von Hagen (see here). In Sweden, recent Social Democratic
minority administrations ensured a strong role for the finance minister vis-à-vis cabinet colleagues and used
co-operation agreements with other parties in the legislature, which ensured broader support for budgetary
measures. With coalition governments, one successful strategy is to negotiate ‘fiscal contracts’ at the time a
government is formed. This is common practice in countries such as the Netherlands, where coalition
agreements bind the participants to key fiscal policy commitments. In other words, procedural devices can
help to ensure that minority governments have majority support in the legislature, or that coalitions with
competing interests adhere to overall fiscal targets. Which approach is suitable depends on the precise
constellation of power in a hung parliament. Of course, whether these solutions can be adopted in the
context of Westminster’s adversarial style of politics remains an open question – but it might well be well
worth a try.
